We introduce a notion of the quantum query complexity of a certificate structure. This is a formalisation of a well-known observation that many quantum query algorithms only require the knowledge of the disposition of possible certificates in the input string, not the precise values therein.
I. INTRODUCTION
Determining the amount of computational resources required to solve a computational problem is one of the main problems in theoretical computer science. At the current stage of knowledge, however, this task seems far out of reach for many problems. In this case, it is possible to analyse the complexity of the problem under some simplifying assumptions.
One of such assumptions is exhibited by the query model. In this model, it is assumed that all computational resources except accessing the input string are free of charge. (For a detailed description of the model, including our case of interest-quantum query complexity, refer to [3] .) Under this assumption, it is possible to prove some tight bounds. In particular, a relatively simple semidefinite program (SDP) was constructed, yielding a tight estimate for the quantum query complexity of any function. This is the adversary bound, we describe in Section V-A.
Unfortunately, for many functions, even this SDP is too hard to solve. In this paper, we investigate a possibility of constructing an even simpler optimization problem under further simplifying assumptions. Our assumptions are motivated by the class of algorithms based on quantum walks. A popular framework for the development of such algorithms [4] includes a black-box checking subroutine that, given the information gathered during the walk, signals if this information is enough to accept the input string. In many cases, the precise content of the gathered information is not relevant for the implementation of the quantum walk, what matters are the possible locations of these pieces of information. We formalise this by the following definition.
In the definition, we use the following notations. If m and n are positive integers, we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and [m, n] to denote the set {m, m+1, . . . , n}. Also, for a sequence x = (x i ) ∈ [q] n and S ⊆ [n], let x S ∈ [q] S denote the projection of x on S, i.e., the sequence (x s1 , . . . , x s ) indexed by the elements s 1 , . . . , s of S.
Definition 1 (Certificate Structure). A certificate structure C on n variables is a collection of non-empty subsets of 2 [n] with each subset closed under taking supersets. We say a function f : D → {0, 1} with D ⊆ [q] n has certificate structure C if, for every x ∈ f −1 (1) , one can find M ∈ C such that ∀S ∈ M ∀z ∈ D : z S = x S =⇒ f (z) = 1.
We are interested in quantum algorithms performing equally well for any function with a fixed certificate structure. Some examples of such algorithms are given in Section II. More formally, define the quantum query complexity of a certificate structure as the maximum quantum query complexity over all functions possessing this certificate structure.
A recently developed computation model of a (nonadaptive) learning graph [5] relies on the certificate structure of the function by definition. This suggests to define the learning graph complexity of a certificate structure as the minimum complexity of a non-adaptive learning graph computing a function (hence, any function) with this certificate structure. Since a learning graph can be transformed into a quantum query algorithm with the same complexity, the learning graph complexity of a certificate structure is an upper bound on its quantum query complexity. In this paper, we prove that these two complexities are actually equal up to a constant factor. Theorem 2. For any certificate structure, its quantum query and learning graph complexities differ by at most a constant multiplicative factor. This means that any quantum query algorithm willing to perform better than the best learning graph has to take the values of the variables into account on the earlier stages of the algorithm. Although Theorem 2 is a very general result, it is unsatisfactory in the sense that the function having the required quantum query complexity is rather artificial, and the size of the alphabet is astronomical. However, for a special case of certificates structures we are about to define, it is possible to construct a relatively natural problem with a modestly-sized alphabet having high quantum query complexity.
Definition 3 (Boundedly Generated Certificate Structure). We say that a certificate structure C is boundedly generated if, for any M ∈ C, one can find a subset
Definition 4 (Orthogonal Array). Assume T is a subset of [q] k . We say that T is an orthogonal array over alphabet [q] iff, for every index i ∈ [k] and for every sequence
We call |T | the size of the array, and k-its length.
(Compared to a standard definition of orthogonal arrays (cf. [6] ), we always require that the so-called strength of the array equals k − 1.) Theorem 5. Assume a certificate structure C is boundedly generated, and let A M be like in Definition 3. Assume the alphabet is [q] for some q ≥ 2|C|, and each A M is equipped with an orthogonal array T M over alphabet [q] of length |A M | and size q |AM |−1 . Consider a function f : [q] n → {0, 1} defined by f (x) = 1 iff there exists M ∈ C such that x AM ∈ T M . Then, the quantum query complexity of f is at least a constant times the learning graph complexity of C.
For example, for a boundedly generated certificate structure C, one can define the corresponding sum problem: Given x ∈ [q] n , detect whether there exists M ∈ C such that j∈AM x j ≡ 0 (mod q). If q ≥ 2|C|, Theorem 5 implies that the quantum query complexity of this problem is at least a constant times the learning graph complexity of C.
Theorem 5 is a generalization of the lower bound for the k-sum problem from [1] , and provides additional intuition on the construction, by linking it to learning graphs. Much of the discussion in [1] applies here as well.
Let us briefly comment on organization of the paper. In Section II, we give some examples of certificate structures, inspired by known computational problems. In Section III, we derive a dual formulation of the complexity of a nonadaptive learning graph. In Section IV, we apply this dual formulation to give lower bounds on the learning graph complexity of the certificate structures from Section II. We demonstrate that transition to the learning graph complexity indeed simplifies the problem by obtaining an almost optimal Ω(n 9/7 ) lower bound for the triangle certificate structure, whereas nothing better than trivial Ω(n) is known for the original triangle problem. Finally, in Section V, we prove both Theorem 2 and 5.
II. EXAMPLES OF CERTIFICATE STRUCTURES
We defined the certificate structure notion in the introduction. Actually, many existing quantum algorithms, implicitly or explicitly, work in these settings. In this section, we recall some of these algorithms and define the corresponding certificate structures. In Section IV, we consider their learning graph complexities.
The most celebrated examples of such algorithms are Grover's search algorithm [7] and Ambainis' algorithm for element distinctness and k-distinctness [8] . As first noticed by Childs and Eisenberg [9] , Ambainis' algorithm can be applied for finding any subset of size k. In other words, it works for any function having the following certificate structure: Definition 6. The k-subset certificate structure C on n elements with k = O(1) is defined as follows. It has n k elements, and, for each subset
In the same paper, Childs and Eisenberg conjectured that Ambainis' algorithm is optimal for the k-sum problem. Theorem 5 can be seen as a strong generalization of this conjecture (as Ambainis' algorithm can be implemented as a learning graph).
Another well-known quantum-walk-based algorithm [10] (implicitly) solves any function with the following certificate structure:
Definition 7. The triangle certificate structure C on n vertices is a certificate structure on n 2 variables defined as follows. Assume that the variables are labelled as x ij where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. The certificate structure has n 3 elements, and, for every triple 1 ≤ a < b < c ≤ n, there exists unique M ∈ C such that S ∈ M if and only if S ⊇ {ab, bc, ac}. (Note that, for this certificate structure, the letter n, that customary denotes the number of input variables, is used to denote the number of vertices. This is a standard notation, and we hope it will not cause much confusion.)
Originally, the algorithm in [10] dealt with the triangle problem: All x ij are Boolean, and the condition on f (x) = 1 is that x ab = x ac = x bc = 1 for some M . The quantum walk algorithm for this certificate structure was lately superseded by an algorithm based on learning graphs [2] . We will show in Section IV that this learning graph is essentially optimal.
Both k-subset and triangle certificate structures are boundedly generated. We also consider some examples of certificate structures that are not. Recall the collision problem [11] . Given an input string x ∈ [q] 2n , the task is to distinguish two cases. In the negative case, all input variables are distinct. In the positive case, there exists a decomposition of the input variables
, but x ai = x aj for all i = j. The set equality problem is defined similarly, with an additional promise that, in the positive case, a i ∈ [n] and b i ∈ [n + 1, 2n] for all i. Finally, the hidden shift problem is defined like the set equality problem with an additional promise that, in the positive case, there exists
. Inspired by these problems, we define the following certificate structures.
Definition 8. Each of the following certificate structures is defined on 2n input variables. In the collision certificate structure, there is unique M for each decomposition
The set equality certificate structure contains only those M from the collision certificate structure that correspond to decompositions with a i ∈ [n] and b i ∈ [n + 1, 2n] for all i. Finally, the hidden shift certificate structure contains only those M from the set equality certificate structure that correspond to decompositions such that d ∈ [n] exists with the property
All certificates structure from Definition 8 are not boundedly generated. The algorithm for the collision problem from [11] actually solves any function possessing the collision certificate structure in O(n 1/3 ) quantum queries, and it is tight [12] . Clearly, the same algorithm is applicable for the set equality and hidden shift certificate structures. The situation with the hidden shift problem is more interesting. This problem reduces to the hidden subgroup problem in the dihedral group [13] , and the latter has logarithmic query complexity [14] . Unlike other algorithms in this section, the latter one is not, in general, applicable to any function with the hidden shift certificate structure.
III. LEARNING GRAPH COMPLEXITY
In this section, we recall the definition of a non-adaptive learning graph from [5] , and derive its dual formulation. Non-adaptive learning graphs were used to construct best known quantum query algorithms for triangle and other subgraph detection [15] , [16] , [2] and associativity testing [2] . Although more general versions of learning graphs were used for k-distinctness [17] , [18] and graph collision [19] , the non-adaptive version is much easier to apply. This makes it important to understand its limitations.
Let E by the set of pairs (S, S ) of subsets of [n] such that S = S ∪{j} for some j / ∈ S. This set is known as the set of arcs of a learning graph on n variables. For e = (S, S ) ∈ E, let s(e) = S and t(e) = S . Definition 9. The learning graph complexity of a certificate structure C on n variables is equal to the optimal value of optimization problems (1) and (2) (see the bottom of the page), where 0/0 in (1b) is defined to be 0.
Eq. (1) is a restatement of the definition of a non-adaptive learning graph from [5] . (In [5] , the complexity was defined as the minimum of (1a) and the maximum of the left hand side of (1b) over all M . The current formulation can be obtained by rescaling all p e (M ) by the same factor. See
also Footnote 1 in [18] .) The second expression (2) is a new one, and requires a proof.
Proof of the equivalence of (1) and (2): The equivalence is obtained by duality. We use basic convex duality [20, Chapter 5] . First of all, we consider both programs with their objective values (1a) and (2a) squared. With this change, (1) becomes a convex program (in fact, an SDP; for the convexity of (1b), see [20, Section 3.1.5]). The program is strictly feasible. Indeed, it is easy to see that (1c) and (1d) are feasible. To assure strong feasibility in (1b), it is enough to take w e large enough. Hence, by Slater's condition, the optimal values of (1) and its dual are equal. Let us calculate the dual. The Lagrangian of (1) is as follows
Here μ M ≥ 0, and ν M,S are arbitrary. Let us first minimize over p e (M ). Each p e (M ) appears three times in (3) with the following coefficients:
where we assume ν M,S = 0 for all S ∈ M . The minimum of this expression clearly is
Plugging this into (3) yields
We can also maximize over μ M , that gives the square of (2a).
We have the following result:
, [17] ). The quantum query complexity of a certificate structure is at most a constant times its learning graph complexity.
In Section V, we prove the reverse statement for all certificate structures.
IV. EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION
In this section, we construct feasible solutions to the dual formulation of the learning graph complexity (2) for the certificate structures from Section II. Their objective values match the objective values of feasible solutions to the corresponding primal formulations (1) that were obtained previously.
Proposition 11. The learning graph complexity (and, hence, the quantum query complexity) of the k-subset certificate structure is Ω(n k/(k+1) ). 
On the other hand, for the objective value (2a), we have
Ref. [17] , [15] show that the corresponding upper bound is O(n k/(k+1 ), thus the result of Proposition 11 is tight. Moreover, Theorem 5 implies that the complexity of the k-sum problem is Θ(n k/(k+1) ), a result previously proven in [1] .
Proposition 12. The learning graph complexity of the hidden shift (and, hence, the set equality and the collision) certificate structure is Ω(n 1/3 ).
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 11. Let C be the hidden shift certificate structure. Define α M (S) as n −1/2 max{n 1/3 − |S|, 0} if S / ∈ M , and as 0 otherwise. Take any S ⊂ [n], j / ∈ S, and let us prove (2b). Again, if |S| ≥ n 1/3 , we are done. Otherwise, there are n choices of M in total, and at most n 1/3 of them are such that S / ∈ M and S ∪ {j} ∈ M . Thus,
The objective value (2a) is n 1/3 . For the set equality and collision certificate structures, just assign α S (M ) = 0 for all M that are not in the hidden shift certificate structure.
The result of this proposition is also tight. The corresponding upper bound can be derived by similar methods as used for the k-sum problem in [17] , [15] . We omit the precise construction.
Proposition 13. The learning graph (and, hence, the quantum query) complexity of the triangle certificate structure is Ω(n 9/7 / √ log n).
The best known upper bound is O(n 9/7 ) as proven in [2] . The proof of the lower bound is rather bulky, and essentially proceeds by showing, in a formal way, that all possible strategies of constructing the upper bound fail.
Proof of Proposition 13: Let E = {uv | 1 ≤ u < v ≤ n} be the set of input variables (potential edges of the graph). Let C be the triangle certificate structure. We will construct a feasible solution to (2) The hard part is to show that (2b) holds up to logarithmic factors. It is easy to see that α S (M ) = 0 if |S| ≥ n 9/7 , hence, we will further assume |S| ≤ n 9/7 . For S ⊂ E and j ∈ E \S, let F (S, j) denote the subset of Hence, k ≈ 12/7 log 2 n. For notational convenience, let j = bc. Then, the second property is determined by deg a = deg S a, the degree of a in the graph with edge set S.
For i ∈ [k], we will define g i (S, M ) so that, for all S ⊂ E of size at most n 9/7 and j ∈ E \ S:
Let g 0 (S, M ) = n −3/2 |S|, for which (6) holds. Even more, we will show that the set K = K(S, j) of i ∈ [0, k] such that (6) is non-zero has size O(1). Thus, for the left hand side of (2b), we will have
where the former term on the right hand size is O(1) and the latter one is O(log n). By scaling all α S (M ) down by a factor of O( √ log n), we obtain a feasible solution to (2) with the objective value Ω(n 9/7 / √ log n). It remains to construct the functions g i (S, M ). In the following, let μ(x) be the median of 0, x, and 1, i.e., μ(x) = max{0, min{x, 1}}. The first interval of deg a will be considered separately from the rest. (6) is O(1).
• It may happen if |{ab, ac} ∩ S| = 1 and j ∈ {ab, ac}, i.e., the transition from the second case of (8) to the first one happens. Moreover, g 1 (S, M ) changes only if deg a ≤ 2n 3/7 . Then j identifies two vertices of the triangle, and the third one is among the neighbours of an endpoint of j having degree at most 2n 3/7 . Thus, the total number of M satisfying this scenario is at most 4n 3/7 . The contribution to (6) is at most O(n 3/7 )(n −3/14 ) 2 = O(1). • Another possibility is that ab, ac ∈ S and deg a changes. In this case, a is determined as an endpoint of j, and b and c are among its at most 2n 3/7 neighbours. The number of M influenced is O(n 6/7 ), and the contribution is O(n 6/7 )(n −9/14 ) 2 = o(1). Finally, we have to show that (7) holds. If M satisfies the condition, then ab, ac ∈ S and deg a ≤ n 3/7 . In this case, the left hand side of (7) is 0.
Other intervals: Now assume the condition d < deg a ≤ 2d with d ≥ n 3/7 . Define a piece-wise linear function τ as follows
It can be interpreted as a continuous version of the indicator function that a vertex has a right degree. Define
where the sum is over the common neighbours of b and c. Let
Let us consider how g i (S, M ) may change and how this contributes to (2b). Now there are three cases how g i (S, M ) may be influenced. We again show that the total contribution to (6) is O(1).
• It may happen that j is incident to a 2 = O(1), as d ≥ n 3/7 . Finally, j may be the last edge of the triangle. We know that deg a > d, hence, either n −3/14 − g i (S, M ) = 0, or ν(S, M ) ≤ 2n 3/7 , in which case, there are O(n 3/7 ) choices of a satisfying the condition. Hence, the left hand side of (7) is O(n 3/7 )(n −3/14 ) 2 = O(1).
If g i (S, M ) − g i (S ∪ {j}, M) = 0, then, in the first three cases, the value of d, up to a small ambiguity, may be determined from the degree of one of the end-points of j. Hence, the set K = K(S, j), as stated previously in the proof, exists.
Automatically, we obtain that the quantum query complexity of the triangle sum problem is Ω(n 9/7 ). Thus, any quantum query algorithm, willing to improve the O(n 9/7 ) bound for the triangle detection problem, will have to take differences between the triangle detection and triangle sum problems into consideration.
V. LOWER BOUND
In this section, we prove Theorems 2 and 5. The results are strongly connected: In the second one we prove a stronger statement from stronger premisses. As a consequence, the proofs also have many common elements.
This section is organized as follows. In Section V-A, we recall the adversary method that we use to prove the lower bound. In the proofs, we will define a number of matrices and argue about their spectral properties. For convenience, we describe the main parameters of the matrices, such as the labelling of their rows and columns, as well as their mutual relationships in one place, Section V-B. In Section V-C, we state the intermediate results important to both Theorems 2 and 5. In Section V-D, we finish the proof of Theorem 5. In Section V-E, we recall the definition and main properties of the Fourier basis, and define the important notion of the Fourier bias. Finally, in Section V-F, we prove Theorem 2.
A. Adversary Bound
The adversary method is one of the main techniques for proving lower bounds on quantum query complexity. At first, it was developed by Ambainis [21] in what later became known as the non-negative-weight variant of the bound. This version of the bound is widely used because of its intuitive combinatorial formulation. Unfortunately, it has severe limitations. In particular, the so-called certificate complexity barrier [22] , [23] implies that the non-negative version of the adversary bound fails to prove a better lower bound than O( √ n) for any function possessing a boundedly generated certificate structure. This renders this version of the bound totally useless for our purposes.
Luckily, a stronger variant of the adversary bound was obtained by Høyer, Lee, andŠpalek [24] . It is the general, or negative-weight version of the bound. After that, the adversary bound was proven to be optimal by Lee, Mittal, Reichardt,Špalek, and Szegedy [25] , [26] . Although being more powerful, this version of the bound is much less intuitive, which explains why it has almost never been used previously. Below, we use a variation of the negative-weight adversary bound from [1] . [[(x, a), (y, b) ]] = 0, x j = y j ; 1, otherwise.
Theorem 15 (Adversary bound [24] , [1] ). In the notations of Definition 14, the quantum query complexity of f is
where
with the maximization over all adversary matrices for f , · is the spectral norm, and • is the entrywise matrix product.
The following result is very useful when proving lower bounds using the adversary method . Lemma 16 ([26] ). Let Δ j be as in Definition 14. Then, for any matrix A of the same size,
We will use it to replace Γ • Δ j in the denominator of (9) with a matrix Γ such that Γ • Δ j = Γ • Δ j . By Lemma 16, this gives the same result up to a factor of 2. We will denote this relation between matrices by Γ Δj −→ Γ .
B. Outline
Let us briefly outline how Theorems 2 and 5 are proven. Let C denote the certificate structure. Let α S (M ) satisfy (2), and be such that (2a) equals the learning graph complexity of C. We define an explicit function f : D → {0, 1} with D ⊆ [q] n having the objective value (2a) of program (2) as a lower bound on its quantum query complexity. The latter is proven using the adversary bound, Theorem 15. For that, we define a number of matrices.
Matrix Γ: At first, we construct a matrix Γ satisfying the following properties. Firstly, it has rows labelled by the elements of [q] n × C, and columns labelled by the elements of [q] n . Thus, if we denote C = {M 1 , . . . , M k }, the matrix Γ has the following form
. . .
where each G M is an [q] n × [q] n -matrix. Next, Γ is at least the objective value (2a). And finally, for each j ∈ [n],
there exists Γ such that Γ Δj −→ Γ and Γ ≤ 1. The matrix Γ has a decomposition into blocks G M similar to (10) .
Thus, Γ has a good value of (9) . But, we cannot use it, because it is not an adversary matrix: It uses all possible inputs as labels of both rows and columns. However, due to the specific way Γ is constructed, we will be able to transform Γ into a true adversary matrix Γ such that the value of (9) is still good. Before we describe how we do it, let us outline the definition of the function f .
Defining the function: Let M be an element of the certificate structure C. Let A 
The orthogonal arrays are chosen so that X M is non-empty and satisfies the following orthogonality property:
For boundedly generated certificate structures, this property is satisfied automatically.
The set of positive inputs is defined by f −1 (1) = M ∈C X M . The set of negative inputs is defined by
It is easy to see that f has C as its certificate structure. The parameters will be chosen so that |f −1 (0)| = Ω(q n ).
Remaining matrices:
Thus, Γ consists of blocks G M , like in (10), where
]. (The latter notation stands for the submatrix formed by the specified rows and columns). We also show that Γ is not much smaller than Γ .
The matrix Γ is obtained similarly from Γ . It is clear that Γ
As Γ is a submatrix of Γ and Γ ≤ 1, we obtain that Γ = O(1) as required. We denote the blocks of Γ by G M . That is,
C. Common Parts of the Proofs
Let e 0 , . . . , e q−1 be an orthonormal basis of C q such that e 0 = 1/ √ q (1, . . . , 1) . Denote E 0 = e 0 e * 0 and E 1 = i>0 e i e * i . These are q × q matrices. All entries of E 0 are equal to 1/q, and the entries of E 1 are given by
For a subset S ⊆ [n], let E S denote j∈[n] E sj where s j = 1 if j ∈ S, and s j = 0 otherwise. These matrices are orthogonal projectors:
We define the matrices G M from (10) by
where α S (M ) are as in (2).
Lemma 17. If Γ and Γ are defined as in Section V-B, all X M satisfy the orthogonality property (12) and |Y | = Ω(q n ), then
Proof:
, hence, by (18) :
Let us calculate the sum s(G M ) of the entries of G M . In the first term, each entry of E ⊗n 0 equals q −n . There are |X M | rows and |Y | columns in the matrix, hence, the sum of the entries of the first term is |X M |/q n |Y |α ∅ (M ).
In the second term,
(On the third step, the orthogonality condition (12) is used. On the last step, we use that the sum of the entries of every column of E ⊗k 1 is zero if k > 0.) Summing up,
We are now ready to estimate Γ . Define two unit vectors
In the remaining part of this section, we define the transformation Γ Δj −→ Γ and state some of the properties of Γ that will be used in the subsequent sections. Using (16), we can define the action of Δ on E 0 and E 1 by
We define Γ by applying this transformation to E 0 and E 1 in the jth position in the tensor product of (18) . The result is again a matrix of the form (10), but with each G M replaced by
where β S (M ) = α S (M ) − α S∪{j} (M ). In particular, β S (M ) = 0 if j ∈ S or S ∈ M . Thus,
In particular, we obtain from (2b) that Γ ≤ 1.
D. Boundedly generated certificate structures
In this section, we finish the proof of Theorem 5. In the settings of the theorem, the orthogonal arrays T From the statement of the theorem, we have |X M | = q n−1 , in particular, they are non-empty. Also, X M satisfy the orthogonality property (12) , and, by (13), we have 
Proof: If we strike out the a M,i th element in all elements of X M , we obtain (Here e * 0 is on the a M,i th element of [q] n .) Similarly for S , and the claim follows from (17) .
For each M , decompose G M from (20) 
Define similarly to Section V-B,
and let Γ i be the matrix consisting of G M,i , for all M ∈ C, stacked one on another like in (10) . Then, Γ = i∈[k] Γ i . We have
by Claim 18. Similarly to (21) , we get Γ i ≤ 1. By the triangle inequality, Γ ≤ k, hence, Γ ≤ k = O (1) . Combining this with (19) , and using Theorem 15, we obtain the necessary lower bound. This finishes the proof of Theorem 5.
E. Fourier Basis
In Section V-C, we defined e i as an arbitrary orthonormal basis satisfying the requirement that e 0 has all its entries equal to 1/ √ q. In the next section, we will specify a concrete choice for e i . Its construction is based on the Fourier basis we briefly review in this section.
Let p be a positive integer, and Z p be the cyclic group of order p, formed by the integers modulo p. Consider the complex vector space C Zp . The vectors (χ a ) a∈Zp , defined by χ a [[b]] = e 2πiab/p / √ p, form its orthonormal basis. Note that the value of χ a [[b] ] is well-defined because e 2πi = 1.
If U ⊆ Z p , then the Fourier bias [27] of U is defined by
It is a real number between 0 and |U |/p. In the next section, we will need the following result stating the existence of sets with small Fourier bias and arbitrary density.
Theorem 19. For any real 0 < δ < 1, it is possible to construct U ⊆ Z q such that |U | ∼ δq, U u = O(polylog(q)/ √ q) and q is arbitrary large. In particular, (1) .
For instance, one may prove a random subset satisfies these properties with high probability [27, Lemma 4.16 ]. There also exist explicit constructions [28] .
F. General Certificate Structures
In this section, we finish the proof of Theorem 2. There are two main reasons why it is not possible to prove a general result like Theorem 5 for arbitrary certificate structures.
A first counterexample is given by Proposition 12 stating that the learning graph complexity of the hidden shift certificate structure is Ω(n 1/3 ) and the statement at the end of Section II that the quantum query complexity of the hidden shift problem is O(log n). The proof in Section V-D cannot be applied here, because k in the decomposition of G M into i∈[k] G M,i would not be bounded by a constant. We solve this by considering much "thicker" orthogonal arrays T (i) M . Next, the orthogonality property (12) is not satisfied automatically for general certificate structures. For instance, assume A
M = {2, 3}, and the orthogonal arrays are given by the conditions x 1 = x 2 and x 2 = x 3 , respectively. Then, for any input x satisfying both conditions, we have x 1 = x 3 , and the orthogonality condition fails for S = {1, 3}.
The problem in the last example is that the orthogonal arrays are not independent because A (1) M and A (2) M intersect.
